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11 Introduction
About every third transaction in international trade occurs within a multinational ﬁrm while an
additional third has at least one multinational as a party to the transaction. This remarkable
current pattern of multinationalization in the global economy has been the source of an important
amount of work in international trade theory. One strand of the literature has provided expla-
nations of internalization decisions by looking at the costs of dissipating intangible assets (see a
good survey of that approach in Markusen (1995) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
Another more recent line of research emphasizes the costs and beneﬁts of allocating residual
rights of control when contracts are incomplete. This rapidly growing literature discusses the
determinants of intra-ﬁrm trade.1 Many of these papers have underlined various elements that
constitute the internal organization of the ﬁrm in an international context2. Important theoretical
insights have been derived on crucial determinants of international trade transactions that are done
internally to the ﬁrm (intra-ﬁrm trade) and those which are done outside the boundaries of the
ﬁrm (outsourcing). In particular, a central insight of this literature has been to explain a ﬁrm’s
internalization decision by the intensity of downstream production in intermediate inputs; with
as a main prediction the fact that ownership rights should be given to the party contributing to
the intensive production stage.
While this theoretical literature has been expanding rapidly, the empirical evidence on these
dimensions has been more limited (Antr` as 2003, Nunn and Treﬂer 2008). In this respect, a seminal
piece of work is Nunn and Treﬂer (2008). Using country/product category data, they investigate
the determinants of the share of total US imports that is intra-ﬁrm. More precisely, they consider
the Antr` as (2003) and Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) empirical predictions explaining a ﬁrm’s
internalization decision by the intensity of downstream production in intermediate inputs. In
particular they test the central prediction that ownership rights should be given to the party
contributing to the intensive production stage. The empirical analysis provides some empirical
support for that prediction.
With respect to the theoretical framework, a limitation of this approach is obviously the
fact that this type of empirical evidence remains conﬁned to country/sectoral level analyses,
while the theory explicitly emphasizes the importance of ﬁrm level determinants. Interestingly,
1See for instance McLaren (2000), Antr` as (2003), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), Antr` as and
Helpman (2004), Marin and Verdier (2004, 2007)
2Some of the most illustrative recent work along this line of research is published in Helpman, Marin and Verdier
(2008).
2although the availability of ﬁrm-level data has led to a great deal of studies of export behavior (as
surveyed by Bernard et al. 2007, Mayer and Ottaviano 2007), much less eﬀort has been spent on
understanding import behavior, and the boundaries of multinational ﬁrms in particular. Hence
little micro-evidence has been provided so far on the internalization of international transactions
at a detailed ﬁrm/product level. The main purpose of this paper is to ﬁll that gap.
Taking advantage of a dataset documenting imports of manufactured goods by French ﬁrms
in 1999, this paper aims at identifying the determinants of the internalization of trade ﬂows
in intermediate products at the ﬁrm, industry, product, and country levels. In particular, we
reconsider the validity of the predictions made in recent theoretical studies of multinationals’
organizational choice and reassess the empirical results of Nunn and Treﬂer (2008). Moreover we
report a number of additional ﬁndings and suggest interpretations that would be useful for further
theoretical developments.
An important contribution of our study is introduce two additional dimensions to the analysis
of Nunn and Treﬂer (2008). First, we relate internalization decisions to ﬁrm-level characteristics
such as TFP, as Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008), among others, have suggested. Second, we
introduce determinants of these decisions at the imported product and the ﬁnal product level.
We can therefore exploit more information on the determinants of internalization than studies of
intra- and inter-ﬁrm trade that rely on US aﬃliate-level data, such as Feinberg and Keane (2006).
We take seriously into account the issues of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity by means
of ﬁxed and/or random eﬀects.
Going down to the level of the ﬁrm, the analysis reveals a ﬁrst very surprising fact that should
be taken into account in future theoretical developments. Even at a ﬁnely deﬁned sectoral level,
one observes substantial factor intensity heterogeneity across ﬁrms (about the same degree of
magnitude as ﬁrm level productivity heterogeneity).
A second striking result is that capital-intensive ﬁrms tend to insource labor-intensive goods
from labor-abundant countries,contrary to the prediction in Antr` as (2003).
Third, we do ﬁnd that ﬁrm productivity increases the likelihood of intra-ﬁrm sourcing like in
Antr` as and Helpman (2004). However, when we interact several measures of headquarter intensity
with ﬁrm level productivity, we ﬁnd that the interaction term is not positively correlated with
intraﬁrm status. This remains true even when allowing for discontinuity along the headquarter
intensity dimension. This casts doubt on the corresponding prediction by Antr` as and Helpman
(2004) and the robustness of the Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) result conﬁrming that prediction on US
data. Our results point towards a more general model where headquarter intensity is ﬁrm speciﬁc
3and possibly correlated with productivity.
Fourth, using the intermediate product dimension, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms producing more complex
goods are more likely to source their complex intermediate inputs within ﬁrm boundaries. This
result has no theoretical counterpart because models typically consider only one foreign input.
Fifth, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of internalizing a transaction increases with distance. There
is no obvious reason why variable trade costs should diﬀer by transaction mode. Therefore our
preferred interpretation is that the ﬁxed costs of entering arms’ length relationships increase more
rapidly with distance than the ﬁxed costs of setting up an aﬃliate. However, further theoretical
research is needed to provide explanations for this ﬁnding.
Finally, we show that an improvement in the contracting environment does not aﬀect all
ﬁrms’ sourcing decisions uniformly. In particular, it leads to a stronger increase in intraﬁrm
transactions for the most productive, capital-intensive, skill-intensive, and headquarter intensive
ﬁrms. This result is reminiscent of the ambiguous eﬀect pointed out by Antr` as and Helpman
(2008). Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that an improvement in the contracting environment aﬀects
disproportionately more contractible goods.
In independent research, Defever and Toubal (2007) test the predictions of a slightly amended
Antr` as and Helpman (2004) model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc (rather than industry-speciﬁc) factor in-
tensity diﬀerences. Using data on French imports in 1999, they show that the the likelihood of
sourcing from an independent supplier is increasing in the intensity in the supplier’s input, in
the ﬁnal producer’s TFP, in the interaction between the two. Furthermore, they show that the
interaction between TFP and institutional quality in the supplier’s country favors intra-ﬁrm trade.
Our work diﬀers from theirs in several respects. First, our considerably larger dataset (that
includes theirs) allows us to include more transactions. While a number of their ﬁndings are
conﬁrmed, we do not conﬁrm the fact that the most productive ﬁrms engage in outsourcing. Indeed
we do ﬁnd that productivity increases the likelihood of intra-ﬁrm transaction coherently with
Antr` as and Helpman (2004). Furthermore, their ﬁnding that the interaction between headquarter
intensity and productivity matters is also rejected by our data, casting doubt on an important
prediction of Antr` as and Helpman (2004).
Second, we introduce several measures of contractibility of imported inputs and inputs used
in the production process of the ﬁnal good, and show that they are signiﬁcant determinants of
the share of intraﬁrm trade. Third, we introduce additional control variables, such as distance or
capital-intensity in ﬁnal good production, which we ﬁnd to be signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations.
However, we do not introduce measures of ﬁxed costs at the ﬁrm-level.
4The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2 we discuss the basic theoretical background
of the literature and its testable predictions. Section 3 presents the description of our dataset and
the deﬁnitions and interpretations of our variables. In section 4, we discuss the empirical results.
Finally section 5 concludes and provides avenues for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we review three important theoretical contributions that help us understand the
determinants of internalization decisions: Antr` as (2003), Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008). They
predict the determinants of the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports by manufacturing ﬁrms,
our variable of interest.
All three models explain internalization decisions using property-rights theory (Grossman and
Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990). One of their building blocks is a partial equilibrium model
of organizational choice which we brieﬂy sketch here.
Consider a ﬁnal-good producer who needs to obtain a speciﬁc intermediate input from a
supplier. Production of the input requires a non-contractible and relationship-speciﬁc investment
by each party. Asset speciﬁcity and contract incompleteness create a two-sided holdup problem,
implying under-investment by both parties.
Property rights over a productive asset provide its owner with residual rights of control. They
create an outside option in bargaining over ex post surplus, and therefore greater incentives to
invest ex ante.
It is assumed that utility is costlessly transferrable between parties ex ante and that ex post
bargaining is eﬃcient. Therefore the organizational form that maximizes expected joint surplus
is chosen. In particular, the higher the intensity in an investment, the more ownership should be
given to the party responsible for this investment.
2.1 Internalization and Final Production Technology
In Antr` as (2003) the two parties involved in production are a headquarter ﬁrm and a foreign
supplier. The headquarter ﬁrm provides capital investment while the supplier provides labor.
This assumption is based on stylised facts on US multinationals’ internal cost-sharing practices.
Antr` as (2003) shows that eﬃciency in labor investments is higher under outsourcing. Therefore his
ﬁrst (partial-equilibrium) prediction is that intraﬁrm imports are more likely in capital-intensive
industries, all else equal.
5Assume CES preferences with elasticity 1
1−α for the ﬁnal product. The global production
function is CRS Cobb-Douglas with constant input shares η and 1 − η. Denote by φ the ﬁnal
producer’s share of surplus in bargaining, and by δ the value of residual rights of control as
a share of joint surplus. Variable proﬁts under integration over variable proﬁts under variable
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This ratio is shown to be monotonically increasing in η, and there exists a unique η∗ for which
it is equal to unity.
The models in Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) have the same qualitative predictions, al-
beit with a diﬀerent interpretation of the factor used intensively by the downstream ﬁrm (called
’headquarter services’).
These models allow for intra-industry TFP diﬀerences. Denote by θi the Hicks-neutral TFP
parameter of ﬁrm i, and denote by fV I and fOS ﬁrm i’s ﬁxed costs of resorting to integration
and outsourcing, respectively.
Start by assuming identical θ’s and f’s. It is predicted that high-η industries or ﬁrms4 are
more likely to have a high share of intra-ﬁrm imports from a given country (Antr` as 2003).
Assume now that ﬁrms vary by their θ’s. If ﬁxed costs do not vary across organizational forms,
then the previous result is unchanged. If they do, then productivity diﬀerences matter. Under
the additional assumption that ﬁxed costs are greater under integration that outsourcing, two
predictions emerge. First, within a given industry, ﬁrms engaging in intra-ﬁrm trade should be
more productive than those that outsource. Second, intra-ﬁrm trade is more likely to occur the
higher is the industry speciﬁc share ηs of the ﬁnal good producer in the value-added chain (Antr` as
and Helpman, 2004).
2.2 Internalization and Host-country Factor Abundance
Antr` as (2003) embeds the model sketched above in a 2x2x2 general equilibrium framework. As-
suming free entry, identical and homothetic preferences, and that immobile endowments are in
the FPE set, he shows that the share of intraﬁrm imports increases in the country’s capital/labor
3See Antr` as (2003), equation 8 p. 1390. As he points out, the absence of factor prices in this variable proﬁt ratio
is an artefact of the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of technology.
4Defever and Toubal (2007) oﬀer the full derivation of this partial equilibrium building block of Antr` as (2003)
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc technologies.
6ratio. The eﬀect goes through the number of ﬁrms in both industries, which increases with capital
abundance.
The two factors that Antr` as (2003) considers are labor and capital. Empirically, he ﬁnds
that the share of US intraﬁrm imports increases with capital abundance in the origin country,
even when controlling for human capital abundance in the origin country. However, it is unclear
whether his theoretical prediction generalises to a model with more industries or more factors.
2.3 Internalization and the Extent of Contract Incompleteness
Antr` as and Helpman (2008) extend their previous model to partial contractibility of production
tasks. There they relate organizational choice in oﬀshore operations to a country’s contracting
environment5. They consider a composite component m and composite headquarter services h.
Both can be decomposed into a continuum of tasks of mass one, some of which are non-contractible.
The extent of contract incompleteness is captured by the range of non-contractible tasks in both
activities, denoted by (µc
h,1] and (µc
m,1], where c refers to the country. The model includes the
Antr` as and Helpman (2004) model as a special case where µh = µm = 0.
Consider a change in the contractible content of component production tasks (which we refer
to as ’contractibility of the input’), all else equal. For low-η sectors or ﬁrms6, that were fully
outsourcing their input production, this does not change anything. However, for high-η ﬁrms or
sectors, we have a diﬀerent prediction.
Holding headquarter services contractibility constant, an improvement in input contractibility
abroad has two eﬀects7 on headquarter-intensive ﬁrms:
• the most productive domestic producers switch to oﬀshore outsourcing (the ’Standard Ef-
fect’);
• the most productive ﬁrms resorting to oﬀshore outsourcing insource from foreign aﬃliates
(the ’Surprise Eﬀect’). This is because the need to provide incentives to component producers
is now lower.
The net eﬀect of an improvement in the contract environment is ambiguous. In sum, improved
contract enforcement in the origin country does not determine organizational choice in itself. As
5This research agenda is motivated by the ﬁnding of Nunn (2007) that cross-country diﬀerences in contracting
institutions explain the variance of trade ﬂows as much as cross-country diﬀerences in human capital.
6Assuming that the distributions of θ and η are independent.
7Nunn and Treﬂer term these two eﬀects the ’Standard Eﬀect’ and the ’Surprise Eﬀect’, respectively.
7explained by Antr` as and Helpman (2008), ’the relative prevalence of alternative organizational
forms depends not only on cross-country diﬀerences in contractibility, but also on the degree
to which contractual institutions are biased toward inputs controlled by the ﬁnal-good producer
or other suppliers.’ To take this input-country pair speciﬁcity into account, empirical studies
should rely on measures of contractibility of the imported input and of other inputs used by the
headquarter ﬁrm, as well as the general quality of the country’s judicial system.
Note that in their model with fully non-contractible investments, Antr` as and Helpman (2004)
found an unambiguously positive eﬀect of contract enforcement in the origin country on the share
of intra-ﬁrm imports. When one allows judicial systems to make some tasks or inputs contractible,
the relative contractibility of these inputs matters to organizational choice as much as their relative
contribution to total output.
3 Data Sources and Variables Used
3.1 Firm-level Imports Data by Country of Origin, Product and Sourcing
mode
We build a unique cross-section dataset of French import ﬂows in 1999 by merging two diﬀerent
data sources.
The ﬁrst database, named EIIG (´ Echanges Internationaux Intra-Groupe), is a survey con-
ducted in 1999 by SESSI (Service des ´ Etudes Statistiques Industrielles, French Ministry of Indus-
try). The survey was addressed to all French ﬁrms trading more than 1 million Euro, owned by
manufacturing groups that control at least 50% of the equity capital of an foreign aﬃliate. The
answer rate was 53%. However, respondent ﬁrms represent 82% of total exports and imports of
French multinationals.
The survey provides a detailed country of origin breakdown of French ﬁrms’ import at product
level (either CPA96 or HS4 4digit) and their sourcing modes - through independent suppliers
and/or aﬃliates. An intra-ﬁrm transaction is deﬁned as a transaction with an aﬃliate controlled
by a single French entity with at least ﬁfty percent of its equity capital.
Aggregating ﬁrms’ transactions by origin country, product classiﬁcation (CPA96 4digit) and
sourcing mode we obtain 76,364 ﬁrm-product-country triples corresponding to 4,193 importers.
31.28% of our observations correspond to intra-ﬁrm trade and the rest is outsourcing.8 These
data has been used by Defever and Toubal (2007) to test a variant of the Antr` as and Helpman
8See Appendix A for details.
8(2004) model. However, given the fact that ﬁrms in the EIIG survey ﬁrms have been selected on
the basis of having substantial ownership and commercial links with foreign ﬁrms, the sample is
clearly biased towards intra-ﬁrm trade. Almost by deﬁnition, each ﬁrm in the EIIG database has
at least one intra-ﬁrm transaction. Indeed, while the SESSI estimates that around 36% of the
total value of manufacturing imports is intra-ﬁrm (Guannel and Plateau, 2003), in the EIIG data
the number is much higher (55.48%). This raises a serious selection bias issue and in order to
solve this problem we make use of another data source.
The second database, coming from French Customs, is the universe of import and export
transactions operated by French ﬁrms as coming out from custom declarations. For transactions
outside the EU15, there is no minimal amount for a transaction to be recorded. Within the EU,
only transactions whose total annual amount for a given country-product couple exceeds 250,000
euros per year should be registered. In practice however, many transactions below this threshold
are still registered in the database. This database has been used by Eaton et al (2004) among others
and it is highly representative of aggregate import and export French ﬂows. Aggregating ﬁrms’
transactions by country of origin and product (CPA96 4digit) we obtain 1,252,462 observations
referring to 126,953 ﬁrms. The total value of imports in the database represents 99% of French
aggregate imports in 1999 as reported by EUROSTAT.
Since the EIIG database represents reasonably well intra-ﬁrm imports, we consider that all
transactions that are reported in the French Customs dataset but not in the EIIG database occur
with a third party. After combining the EIIG with the 1999 French Customs data, we further
eliminate ﬂows who report France as the origin country of imports (basically transactions with
overseas French territories). The ﬁnal import ﬂows dataset covers 1,141,393 ﬁrm-country-product-
sourcing mode combinations, corresponding to 126,926 importers, 201 countries and 272 products
(CPA96 4digit).
3.2 Data on Firm Characteristics
The primary data source for ﬁrm’s characteristics is the EAE databases (Enquˆ ete Annuelle En-
treprise) provided by both SESSI and SCEES (Service Central des Enquˆ etes et des ´ Etudes Statis-
tiques, French Ministry of Agriculture). The database provides detailed balance sheet information
on all French ﬁrms with at least 20 employees and we focus in our analysis on ﬁrms whose primary
activity is in the manufacturing sector (NACE rev1 D category). Firms in the EAE database rep-
resents 9.8% of the total number of French manufacturing ﬁrms but 87.2% of production in 1999
as reported by EUROSTAT.
93.3 Description of the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
We index ﬁrms by i, products by p and countries by c. Our dependent variable, yi,p,c, represent
the sourcing mode of imported product p from country c chosen by of ﬁrm i (1=intra-ﬁrm;
0=outsourcing).
Our independent variables capture determinants of the internalization decision at the level of
the ﬁrm, country, imported input and ﬁnal product (the latter denoted by f).
3.3.1 Dependent Variable
yi,p,c is a binary variable that takes value 1 (intra-ﬁrm) or 0 (outsourcing) depending on the nature
of the recorded total annual import transactions at the ﬁrm level of product p from country c in
the year 1999. In the case a French ﬁrm i import product p from country c from a foreign aﬃliate
then yi,p,c = 1, while if the transactions occurs with a third party yi,p,c = 0.9
3.3.2 Firm Level Variables
TFPi stands for Total Factor Productivity of ﬁrm i and is estimated as the residual (plus the
constant) of a log-linearized three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function, with labor, capital
and material inputs as production inputs. We use the revenue-based Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
estimator described in Appendix B. Details on the estimation procedure are provided in Appendix
A.
ki is the log of the ratio between the capital stock and employment of ﬁrm i and we use it as
a measure of capital intensity. η
hq
i ∈ [0,1] is the ratio of value added over total sales of a ﬁrm
i. We consider it as a proxy of the relative importance of the ﬁnal production stage in the value
added chain. Finally ηsk
i is the log of the ratio between total wage expenses and employment of
ﬁrm i. This variable is meant to capture the average skills of workers of ﬁrm i with the underlying
hypothesis being that more skilled workers are paid higher salaries. Indeed, when aggregating ηsk
i
across two digit NACE rev1 industries, we obtain a high correlation (0.67) with the share of the
workforce having at least a secondary education. Furthermore, we will show later on that while
9The use of a binary response model is justiﬁed by the fact that in the data only a very small fraction of
transaction is ‘mixed’, i.e ﬁrms importing a given product from a given country partly intra-ﬁrm and partly from an
independent supplier. We keep most of this mixed transactions information by recording as intra-ﬁrm or outsourcing
a transaction for which at least 80% of the total value occurs with one of the two sourcing modes. As for neglected
transactions, they would just provide us with 1.5% more observations. See Appendix A for details
10the correlation between ηsk
i and productivity is positive, it is too low to claim that ηsk
i reﬂects
ﬁrm productivity only.
3.3.3 Imported Products Variables
Unlike previous empirical papers dealing with contract incompleteness and trade like Levchenko
(2007), Nunn (2007) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) we are able to identify all international trans-
actions at the product and ﬁrm level. Therefore, in our data, a ﬁrm typically imports several
products (inputs), either from a foreign aﬃliate (intra-ﬁrm) or from a third party (outsourcing),
that vary a lot in their degree of sophistication.
Because of data constraints, previous empirical studies had to use an ‘average’ measure of
the contract complexity of the whole production process, based on the US input-output matrix.
Levchenko (2007) built a Herﬁndahl index measuring the degree of variety of inputs needed in the
production process. Nunn (2007) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) used the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation
to proxy for the contract complexity of inputs and reconstructed, using input-output coeﬃcients
as weights, an average contract complexity of the ﬁnal good production.
Our data allow us to go one step further and attribute directly a level of contract complexity
to each imported product. We analyze how ﬁrm i producing a speciﬁc ﬁnal product f chooses
to source inputs p of diﬀerent contract complexity either via intra-ﬁrm or via outsourcing. In
particular, we follow the idea of Nunn (2007) to attribute to an input a degree of contract com-
pleteness that depends on whether the product is sold on an organized exchange, reference priced
or neither of the two. We have thus built 2 alternative variables measuring the degree of contract
completeness of an intermediate product p. Denoting by Rneither
j (R
ref priced
j ) a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if the HS6 product j is neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference
priced (not reference priced),10 and by θp,j the share of the HS6 product j in the French imports
of CPA96 4digit product p in 1999 we have:11
1. µ1













Summary statistics on µ1
p and µ2
p are reported in Table ??.
10We actually use the ‘Liberal’ Rauch classiﬁcation. Results are virtually unchanged if we use the ‘conservative’
one.
11See Appendix A for details.
11Table 1: Summary Statistics on µ1
p and µ2
p
Variable Observ. Mean St. Dev Min Max
µ1
p 247 0.403 0.449 0 1
µ2
p 247 0.181 0.331 0 1
Finally, in order to measure the capital and skill intensity of the imported product p, we have
constructed the variables kp and hp using French technology. kp equals the average log capital-
labor ratio in the industry producing good p, while hp equals the average of the log of the ratio
between total wage expenses and employment in the industry producing p.12 We acknowledge the
fact that these are imperfect measure of the capital and skill intensity of the imported product.
However, we will see that some useful insights may be obtained by using these proxies.
3.3.4 Final Product Variables
As explained before we can observe detailed records of distinct intermediate inputs p imports used
for the production of a speciﬁc ﬁnal good f. Therefore, contrary to previous studies, we can also
take into account the contractibility of a ﬁnal good f, in addition to the contractibility of an
imported input.
We will measure the contractibility of the ﬁnal good f with two alternative measures that are
still based on the Rauch classiﬁcation. Denoting by Rneither
j (R
ref priced
j ) a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the PRODCOM2002 8 digit product j is neither sold on an organized exchange
nor reference priced (not reference priced), and by θf,j the share of the PRODCOM2002 8 digit
product j in the French production of CPA96 4digit product f in 1999 we have:13
1. µ1













Summary statistics on µ1
f and µ2
f are reported in Table ??. These alternative measures proxy
for the degree of contract completeness of the ﬁnal product f. As a matter of fact, µ1
f and µ2
f
are pretty correlated with the equivalent Nunn (2007) measures of overall production complexity
12See Appendix A for details.
13See Appendix A for details.
12relying on the US input-output matrix. When comparing them across the 29 ISIC rev2 3 digit
sectors (the only classiﬁcation for which our data are comparable to those of Nunn) the correlation
is, respectively, 0.78 for µ1
f and 0.42 for µ2
f.
Table 2: Summary Statistics on µ1
f and µ2
f
Variable Observ. Mean St. Dev Min Max
µ1
f 218 0.373 0.440 0 1
µ2
f 218 0.158 0.311 0 1
We acknowledge the fact that what we should in principle measure is not the degree of con-
tractibility or mode of exchange of the ﬁnal product f but the contractibility of the tasks performed
by the ﬁnal producer. However, this shortcoming would remain even if we construct a measure
based on an input-output matrix like in Nunn (2007).
3.3.5 Origin Country Variables
As to the exporting country c characteristics, we use rather standard variables. kc and hc are
(respectively) the log of the capital/labor and human capital/labor ratios provided by Hall and
Jones (1999). These variables are available for 115 countries.
Qc is a measure of quality of institutions and comes from the “rule of law” from Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). This is a weighted average of a number of variables that measure
individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement
of contracts in each country between 1997 and 1998. This variable is available for 147 countries.
Same−leg−origc is a dummy indicating whether country c adopts a French civil law system.
This variable, taken from Djankov et al. (2003), proxy for the degree of legal similarity between
the exporting country c and the importing country (France).
The last set of variables comes from CEPII (Centre d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales). Distwc is the log of distance of country c to France. The distance is calculated
starting from regional distances which are then aggregated at the country level using region
populations as weights. Further details may be found in Head and Mayer (2002). Colonyc is
dummy indicating whether country c was a former French colony while Languagec is a dummy
indicating whether French is spoken in country c.
134 Empirical evidence
We use a logit model to estimate the impact of the various determinants of sourcing mode and
denote by yi,p,c the binary response dependent variable that takes value 1 if the transaction
is intra-ﬁrm and 0 if it corresponds to outsourcing.14 In our analysis we use the information
constructed matching the EIIG and Custom databases for the year 1999, i.e 1,141,393 ﬁrm-
country-product-sourcing mode combinations, corresponding to 126,926 importers, 201 countries
and 272 products.15
Throughout the analysis we will provide both test of empirical predictions of certain models
(Results) as well as some important stylized fact concerning intra-ﬁrm and outsourcing (Stylized
Facts). Before going into estimations we report a ﬁrst stylized fact:
• Stylized Fact 1: There are few intra-ﬁrm import transactions, but they are of a high amount.
Indeed in our data only 2% of transactions are intra-ﬁrm but they correspond to 25% of total
imports‘ value. In comparison Zeile (1997) reports a 42.7% share of intra-ﬁrm trade in US imports.
However, these ﬁgures are not comparable because the deﬁnition of a foreign aﬃliate in the French
EIIG is much more demanding (50% or more of the equity capital) than the US deﬁnition (10%).
In addition the EIIG lacks coverage of some intra-ﬁrm transactions (due to non-respondents) that
we consider as outsourcing.
There are certainly many possible interpretations of this fact. One possibility, in line with
Antr` as and Helpman (2004) and (2008), is that, due to higher ﬁxed costs entailed by intra ﬁrm
activities compared to outsourcing, higher volumes are necessary in order to break even.
4.1 Firm-Speciﬁc Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade
In this Section we explore the ﬁrm-level determinants of the intra-ﬁrm vs outsourcing choice.
To that purpose we merge our import ﬂows data with the ﬁrm level information coming from
the EAE database. We obtain a smaller dataset of 247,528 ﬁrm-country-product-sourcing mode
combinations corresponding to 16,383 importers, 201 countries, and 272 products. These observa-
tions still represent more than 60% of French imports from the manufacturing sector.16 Focusing
14Results are robust to the alternative probit speciﬁcation.
15The fact that we restrict our analysis to ﬁrms engaged in either international intra-ﬁrm or outsourcing activities
only (thus neglecting ﬁrms that have transactions with French aﬃliates or source inputs within France) is not an
issue because the theoretical predictions we test concern precisely this set of ﬁrms. In other words, the population
of interest for us is the population of importing ﬁrms, so that we have no sample selection problems in this respect.
16In this smaller dataset 5.5% of transactions are intra-ﬁrm, representing 34% of the value of imports.
14on ﬁrm-level determinants, we will use sector, country and product ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
(potentially endogenous) unobservable characteristics in the 3 dimensions.
Our choice of regressors is inﬂuenced by the property-rights approach to multinational ﬁrm
boundaries. As mentioned in Section ??, Antr` as and Helpman (2004) predict that the most
productive ﬁrms within an industry engage in intra-ﬁrm trade.
Second, we also consider the result by Antr` as (2003) that intra-ﬁrm trade is more prevalent
in capital-intensive industries in the US. In unreported estimations, we conﬁrm his industry-level
result in the French case. However, the same theoretical mechanism should work within a sector.
Provided there is substantial variation in capital intensity within narrowly deﬁned sectors, we
investigate whether ﬁrm-level capital intensity ki can aﬀect the intra-ﬁrm decision.
Finally, another key variable in Antr` as (2003) and Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) is the
intensity in the input provided by the Northern ﬁrm (denoted by η in Section ??). The latter two
models predict that no intra-ﬁrm should take place in in low η (component-intensive) industries.
This prediction is not valid in our data. Intra-ﬁrm trade and outsourcing coexist in virtually
all NACE rev1 4 digit industry level (roughly 250 industries). While we cannot exclude that
all industries are above the model’s capital-intensity threshold enough, an appealing alternative
explanation is that there is within-industry heterogeneity in skill and headquarter intensity. We
use two measures of headquarter intensity: the ratio of value added produced in the North over
sales (as suggested by Defever and Toubal, 2007)17, η
hq
i , and the log of the ratio of wage expenses
over employment, ηsk
i .
We start by providing some descriptive statistics on our ﬁrm-level regressors. One original
contribution of this paper is to show that the correct unit of analysis for capital intensity as well
for η is the ﬁrm and not the product. Although it has been overlooked in theoretical models, ﬁrms
are not only highly heterogeneous in their productivity but also in their capital, skill and input
choices.
Table ?? provide the standard deviations (column 2) and correlations (columns 3 to 6) between




i ) on our whole data. Keeping in mind that TFPi, ki and ηsk
i are constructed
using logs (so are unit of measurement independent) and that η
hq
i varies between 0 and 1, one
can see from standard deviations that there is a lot of heterogeneity across ﬁrms in the whole
manufacturing sector with TFP and capital intensity showing the highest variability. Correlation
17In a world of complete contracts and competitive markets η would simply be the cost share of services provided
in the North. Under incomplete contracts the link between factor intensity and cost shares is less evident.
15Table 3: Standard deviations and correlations of TFPi, ki, η
hq
i , and ηsk
i
Correlation with





ki 0.98 -0.00 1.00
η
hq
i 0.18 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
ηsk
i 0.31 0.11 0.25 0.13 1.00










ki,NES 0.82 0.06 1.00
η
hq
i,NES 0.16 -0.15 -0.02 1.00
ηsk
i,NES 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.12 1.00
between TFP and the other three ﬁrm-level variables are either negligible or relatively small.
Furthermore, correlations between ki, η
hq
i and ηsk
i are also pretty low.
We measure within-industry heterogeneity in these variables by computing deviations to in-
dustry averages. Deﬁne ki,NES the value of ki minus its NES114 industry average (56 industries),
and apply the same notation to other variables. We report the standard deviations and correla-
tions of these within-sector variables in Table ??. As one can notice, the standard deviation of
productivity within sectors is around 30% of the corresponding value on the whole manufactur-
ing. This means that 70% of the standard deviation of ﬁrm-level productivity is due to diﬀerences
across sectors. However, the variability of ki, η
hq
i , and ηsk
i is only slightly reduced when account-
ing for diﬀerences across industries. Even in narrowly deﬁned industries, the variance of capital,
headquarter and skill intensity at the ﬁrm level is still very high. In particular capital intensity
(ki,NES) displays even more heterogeneity than TFP and skill intensity (ηsk
i,NES) has a standard
deviation within a sector which is not that far from the one of TFP. The same qualitative pattern
emerges if we narrow our deﬁnition of industry to go down at the NACE rev1 4 digit level.
Table ?? shows a positive but not dramatically high correlation between TFPi,NES and the
other variables Finally, cross-correlations between ki,NES , η
hq
i,NES and ηsk
i,NES are never very high
and suggest that the 3 variables provide diﬀerent pieces of information on the technology of the
16ﬁnal good producer.18 We can thus state that:
• Stylized Fact 2: the correct unit of analysis for k and η is the ﬁrm and not the industry.
In order to test the relevance of these ﬁrm-level variables we estimate the following logit model:
y∗
i,p,c = α + β1TFPi + β2ki + β3η
hq
i + β4ηsk
i + DNES + Dp + Dc + εi,p,c (1)
yi,p,c =

 1 if y∗
i,p,c ≥ 0 (intra − firm)
0 if y∗
i,p,c < 0 (outsourcing)

.
where DNES, Dp and Dc stands, respectively, for sector, product and country dummies. Table
?? reports estimations of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of ??. From the ﬁrst to the fourth column we
estimate, and report marginal eﬀects, of each of the 4 ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables separately while in
the ﬁfth column we estimate them altogether. Explanatory variables have always a positive and
highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient suggesting that:
• Result 1: Intra-ﬁrm trade is more likely, the higher is ﬁrm productivity. This ﬁnding is in
line with the theoretical predictions of both Antr` as and Helpman (2004) and Antr` as and
Helpman (2008) and is a brand new empirical result. In fact, in his detailed analysis of
Japanese data, Tomiura (2007) is not able to distinguish between intra-ﬁrm vs. outsourcing
in imports.
• Result 2: Capital, headquarter and skill intensity all favor intra-ﬁrm trade. However, they
need to be evaluated at the level of the ﬁrm. This brand new empirical ﬁnding is substan-
tially in line with the residual property rights literature predictions but further suggest that
heterogeneity in capital, headquarter and skill intensity needs to be accounted for.
A last comment is in order with respect to Result 1. Using similar French import data, Defever
and Toubal (2007) provide the opposite ﬁnding. In particular, they show that the likelihood
of sourcing from a foreign aﬃliate is actually decreasing in the ﬁnal producer’s TFP. The key
18Even the most sophisticated TFP estimation techniques rely on the assumption that input shares are constant
across ﬁrms. One may thus wonder how reliable TFP estimations are, even within narrowly deﬁned sectors, if
ﬁrms actually use diﬀerent technologies. This issue has been raised previously in the ﬁrm productivity literature
(e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1998), and there is no clear consensus on how to proceed. This is more an issue with
the deﬁnition of TFP rather than an econometric challenge. In unreported regressions we use a more conservative
measure of productivity (value added per worker), and obtain the same qualitative results.
17Table 5: Firm i-speciﬁc determinants of intra-ﬁrm trade. Dependent variable: yi,p,c=1 for intra-
ﬁrm.












NES114 sectoral dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Country and product dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 238,841 238,841 238,841 238,057 238,057
Pseudo R2 0.1413 0.1299 0.1015 0.1322 0.1668
Log Likelihood -43,836 -44,271 -45,722 -44,114 -42,345
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** , * denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
element behind such diﬀerent ﬁndings is the fact that we do not rely on the same databases.
Defever and Toubal (2007) build on the EIIG survey only while we further complement these data
with the universe of French ﬁrm-level imports transactions coming from Customs declarations.
By construction, ﬁrms in the EIIG survey are all multinational having foreign aﬃliates and they
almost all do at least one intra-ﬁrm import transaction. Although such ﬁrms engage in both intra-
ﬁrm and outsourcing transactions depending on the speciﬁc product and country, the sample is
clearly biased towards intra-ﬁrm trade ﬁrms and is thus questionable what we can learn from such
a speciﬁc sub-population.
4.2 Country and Product Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade
In this Section we explore the country and product speciﬁc determinants of the intra-ﬁrm vs
outsourcing choice in the light of the residual property rights approach literature with incomplete
contracts. We will exploit the full import ﬂow dataset (1,141,393 ﬁrm-country-product-sourcing
mode combinations) using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to control for potentially endogenous unobservable
ﬁrm characteristics. Quite a lot of ﬁrms in the data indeed import diﬀerent products from many
countries under diﬀerent sourcing modes. These observations provide the source of identiﬁcation
of our conditional ﬁxed eﬀect logit model.
18Summary of theoretical predictions. Antr` as (2003) predicts that intra-ﬁrm trade is more
likely with capital abundant countries. Arguably, speciﬁc skills are needed in the production of the
foreign input and the headquarter ﬁrm can even partially provide those skills with a technology
transfer. Following the same logic we use both skill abundance and capital abundance (hc and kc)
as regressors. Previous empirical studies based on aggregate data (like Nunn and Treﬂer, 2008)
have not tested this hypothesis yet.
Another determinant suggested by Antr` as and Helpman (2004) is the quality of institutions
in the origin country (South). They ﬁnd that an increase in the quality of institutions Qc of the
exporting country favors unambiguously intra-ﬁrm trade relative to oﬀshore outsourcing. But the
prediction becomes ambiguous under partially incomplete contracting (Antr` a and Helpman 2008).
If the quality of contract enforcement rises in the South and improves tasks’ contractibility under
both sourcing modes then there are two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, more low-productive
ﬁrms start outsourcing in the South (Standard Eﬀect); on the hand some high-productivity im-
porters start integrating as there is less need to provide incentives to the foreign supplier (Surprise
Eﬀect).
Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), using industry-level data on intra-ﬁrm trade ﬁnd that the Surprise
Eﬀect dominates. We will check here if this ﬁnding is robust to ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics. In the
next Subsection we will try to isolate the two diﬀerent eﬀects by interacting institutional quality
with ﬁrms’ characteristics, since the theoretical eﬀect comes from two sub-populations of ﬁrms.
Testing the theory. In order to test the relationship between contract enforcement quality and
incomplete contracting highlighted in Antr` as and Helpman (2008) one tempting idea, pioneered
by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), is to interact the country-speciﬁc quality of institutions Qc with the
intermediate product level of contractibility (µp∗Qc).19 However, we do not believe this is a good
strategy.
When thinking deeply about what we can really test about the theory, one clear shortcoming
comes to mind. A typical ﬁrm i in the data imports many intermediate products and not just one
as in Antr` as and Helpman (2008) model. Therefore, µp ∗ Qc confounds two things: 1) the choice
of an optimal sourcing mode for products with diﬀerent levels of contractibility; 2) the choice of
an optimal sourcing mode for countries with diﬀerent levels of contract enforcement.
Concerning the issue of optimal sourcing in the case of many inputs, the theory is essentially
19Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) actually interact Qc with the “average” contractibility of the inputs needed for the
production of ﬁnal product f only (via the US input-output matrix).
19silent. We believe that the sign and signiﬁcance of covariates measuring contractibility of both
the ﬁnal good and intermediate inputs (µf and µp) will provide useful insights for the design of a
more general model dealing with many inputs and outputs.
As for the second point, Antr` as and Helpman (2008) consider an improvement of intermediate
input contractibility in the the South, while keeping the level of contractibility of the same input
in the North constant. Empirically, contractibility in the South is a function f(·) of µp and Qc).
Therefore to reproduce Antr` as and Helpman’s comparative statics we need to estimate the partial
derivative of f(·) with respect to Qc. In the simple log-linear speciﬁcation we adopt, Qc and µp
are separate regressors. The partial derivative of f(·) corresponds to the coeﬃcient multiplying
Qc.20
Concerning other product and country characteristics, there are a number of variables of in-
terest for which, however, background theoretical models have no clear prediction. Nevertheless,
we include these variables in our estimations because we see them as important controls. Further-
more, the sign and signiﬁcance of these additional regressors will provide stylized facts that can
inspire future theoretical work.
The ﬁrst set of variables are the capital and skill intensity of the intermediate good (respectively
kp and hp) reconstructed using French technology. Other interesting variables are controls for
ﬁxed as well as variable costs of engaging into intra-ﬁrm and/or outsourcing activities like log of
distance of country c to France (Distwc), having been a French colony (Colonyc), sharing French
as a common language (Languagec), and adopting a French civil law system (Same−leg−origc).21
In order to test the relevance of these country and product level variables we start by estimating
the following conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logit model on the whole import ﬂow dataset:
y∗
i,p,c = α + β1 kc + β2 hc + β3 µp + β4 Qc + β5 kp + β6 hp + +β7 Distwc
+β8 Colonyc + β9 Languagec + β10 Same − leg − origc + i + εi,p,c
(2)
20In unreported regressions we introduce an additional interaction term, µp∗Qc, and ﬁnd that it is not signiﬁcant.
Therefore we rule out more complex speciﬁcations of f(·).
21In North-South models integrating the intra-ﬁrm vs. outsourcing sourcing choice (e.g. Antr` as and helpman,
2004), one key variable is the labor cost in the South. As GDP per capita is usually highly correlated with wages,
one tempting idea is to use it as a proxy for labor cost. However, we do not believe this is a good choice for the
following reasons. First, GDP per capita is at best a poor proxy for labor cost. Wages and productivity vary
across countries and what we would really need is a productivity deﬂated measure of wages for country c (we leave
this exercise for future work). Moreover, per-capita GDP (which is an output variable) is very correlated with the
determinants of a country productivity like capital/labor ratio, human capital/labor ratio as well as with the quality
of institutions. Therefore, for the above reasons, we decide not to use GDP per capita as an additional control.
20yi,p,c =

 1 if y∗
i,p,c ≥ 0 (intra − firm)
0 if y∗
i,p,c < 0 (outsourcing)

.
where i is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect potentially correlated with explanatory variables.
Column (1) and (2) of Table ?? report the estimated marginal eﬀects and standard errors of
model (??). The two set of estimations diﬀers in the measure used for the contractibility of the
imported input: µ1
p in column (1) and µ2
p in column two.
This econometric speciﬁcation is very general as it allows us to control for unobserved ﬁrm-level
characteristics. However, the main drawback is that identiﬁcation relies on ﬁrms engaged in both
intra-ﬁrm and outsourcing activities in diﬀerent countries and/or products only. This reduces a lot
the actual number of information used in estimations (see the row ‘number of actual observations
used in estimations’ in Table ??) and raises sample selection issues. Another implication of using
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects is that we cannot identify the impact of the contractibility of the ﬁnal good µf,
as it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
To check the robustness of our results we have: 1) Estimated the same model but with ﬁrm
random eﬀects. This this allow us to introduce µf as an additional variable and to exploit the
entire dataset with the exception of some observations for which we have no value for µf and/or
µp.22 Estimations results are provided in column (3) to (4) of Table ??; 2) Estimated the following
logit model on the smaller dataset of 247,528 ﬁrm-country-product-sourcing mode combinations
for which ﬁrm level information is available:
y∗
i,p,c = α + β1 kc + β2 hc + β3 µp + β4 µf + β5 Qc + β6 kp + β7 hp + +β8 Distwc






 1 if y∗
i,p,c ≥ 0 (intra − firm)
0 if y∗
i,p,c < 0 (outsourcing)

.
where we add the ﬁnal good contractibility and we control for observable ﬁrms characteristics
(ﬁrm productivity as well as capital, headquarter and skill intensity) indicated by the vector Xi.
Estimations results are provided in column (5) to (6) of Table ??. To save space we do not report
22For some ﬁrms, especially those whose primary activity is in the service and/or distribution sector, we cannot
associate a level of contractibility for their ﬁnal product. This is due to the fact that the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation,
that is building block of our contractibility measure, is concerned essentially with manufacturing, agriculture and
mining goods. The same issue apply to imported products.
21Table 6: Product and Country-speciﬁc determinants of intra-ﬁrm trade. Dependent variable:
yi,p,c=1 for intra-ﬁrm (marginal eﬀects presented).
Estimated speciﬁcation 1 2 3 4 5 6
kc -0.0091** -0.0067** -0.0170*** -0.0167*** -0.0078*** -0.0077***
(0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0009)
hc -0.0277** -0.0207** -0.0238 -0.0257 0.0078** 0.0074**
(0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0035) (0.0035)
µ1
p -0.0336*** -0.0411*** -0.0094***
(0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0011)
µ2








Qc 0.0897*** 0.0660*** 0.1016*** 0.1032*** 0.0447*** 0.0447***
(0.0225) (0.0166) (0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0057) (0.0057)
kp -0.0123*** -0.0166*** -0.0119*** -0.0270*** 0.0012** -0.0018***
(0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0005)
hp -0.0105 -0.0083 -0.0209* -0.0243** -0.0095*** -0.0102***
(0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Distwc -0.0097*** -0.0073*** -0.0052* -0.0050* 0.0018*** 0.0018***
(0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Colonyc 0.1636*** 0.1272*** 0.1577*** 0.1597*** 0.0048*** 0.0050***
(0.0101) (0.0078) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Languagec -0.0107** -0.0081** -0.0113** -0.0117** -0.0072*** -0.0071***
(0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Same − leg − origc 0.0139*** 0.0102*** 0.0169*** 0.0168*** 0.0099*** 0.0099***
(0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Estimation method conditional conditional random ﬁrm random ﬁrm logit with logit with
ﬁrm ﬁxed ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects eﬀects controls controls
eﬀects logit eﬀects logit logit logit Xi Xi
Number of potential observations 1,141,393 1,141,393 1,141,393 1,141,393 247,528 247,528
Number of actual observations
used in estimations 36,217 36,217 920,413 920,413 199,870 199,870
Pseudo R2 0.1492 0.1486
Log Likelihood -14,227 -14,253 -54,731 -54,790 -39,285 39,313
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** , * denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
22coeﬃcients of controls Xi. Again, few observations are lost because we have no value for µf and/or
µp.
Looking across the diﬀerent sets of estimates in Table ?? reveals that, with very few exceptions,
the sign and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients depicts a pretty clear and coherent picture. In particular,
we can state the following results:
• Result 3: Intra-ﬁrm trade is more likely with capital scarce countries. This original ﬁnding
is at odds with the Antr` as (2003) model.23
• Result 4: Intra-ﬁrm trade is more likely with countries having good judicial institutions.
We do not have any particular interpretation of Result 3. Antr` as (2003) predicts that capital
abundant countries (high kc) should host more intra-ﬁrm trade under the very strong assumptions
of capital immobility and factor price equalization. These assumptions are probably unrealistic in
our dataset. Interestingly enough, when looking at kp, one can see that intra-ﬁrm trade is more
likely to involve imported inputs with a low capital-labor ratio. Overall, our data suggest that
ﬁrms engage in intra-ﬁrm activities in capital-scarce countries in order to produce low capital-
intensity inputs.
Result 4 states that the better is a country judicial system (high Qc), the less likely is that
ﬁrms engage in arms’length international relationships. This is in line with the predictions of
the Antr` as and Helpman (2004) model. In the light of the more general Antr` as and Helpman
(2008) model, we conﬁrm in French data the ﬁnding by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) that the Surprise
Eﬀect dominates. We strengthen this result by controlling for both imported and ﬁnal good
contractibility as well as for ﬁrm heterogeneity.
To the extent that a better legal protection reduces costs of agents’ interactions outside the
ﬁrm, Result 4 challenges the transaction costs theory of the multinational ﬁrm boundaries devel-
oped for example in McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Incentives based on the
optimal allocation of residual property rights over the imported product are the key mechanism
that allow Antr` as and Helpman (2004) and Antr` as and Helpman (2008) to rationalize the Surprise
Eﬀect.
Nevertheless our ﬁndings are, especially looking at the contract complexity of the goods in-
volved in intra-ﬁrm trade (µp and µf), also coherent with another story. Let us ﬁrst state the
following stylized fact:
23This result is robust to considering either kc as the only explanatory variable or kc and a subset of the other
covariates.
23• Stylized fact 3: The production of complex intermediate and ﬁnal goods (low µp and µf)
is more likely to occur within the ﬁrm boundaries This original ﬁnding is not a theoretical
prediction of any residual property rights approach model because these models usually
consider only two inputs (one domestic and one foreign) and no general comparative static
result can be provided on the relationship between an input complexity and its optimal
sourcing mode.
Contract intensive goods are thus more likely to be processed within the ﬁrm boundaries and
we know, from Result 4, that intra-ﬁrm international activities are more likely in countries with
good judicial institutions. An alternative to the property-rights approach is to consider that
internalization reduces the dissipation of intangible assets. Complex inputs are valuable for ﬁrms
in part because they embody costly R&D eﬀorts and provide producers with market power. As
they require physical and legal protection to prevent imitation, ﬁrm boundaries represent a safe
place to put these valuable intangible assets. Countries providing better protection of property
rights oﬀer more guarantees against imitation.
As far as the skill abundance is concerned, neither the product (hp) nor the country dimension
(hc) provide a clear pattern in distinguishing between intra-ﬁrm vs outsourcing. Coeﬃcients are
sometimes either positive or negative while being not signiﬁcant in may cases.
Finally, one may note the positive impact of colonial ties (Colonyc) and sharing a common
legal origin (Same−leg−origc) on the decision to engage in intra-ﬁrm. The impact of a common
language (Languagec) is instead negative while results on distance are ambiguous (Distwc). We
do not believe that these coeﬃcients convey much information because they at best provide the
relative magnitude at which unobservable ﬁxed and variables costs embedded in our covariates
aﬀect the sourcing decision. However, we do believe that these variables represent important
controls for our analysis.
4.3 Interaction Between Firm Heterogeneity and Country/Product Charac-
teristics on Intra-Firm Trade
In Subsection ?? we have explored the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity in explaining the oﬀshore sourc-
ing mode, while in Subsection ?? we have looked at the impact of some country and product
characteristics. We can push the analysis of heterogeneity further by looking at whether ﬁrms
with diﬀerent productivity and/or capital, skills and headquarter intensity value diﬀerently the
capital intensity of the host country, contractibility, quality of institutions, etc. This amounts to
24look at interactions between ﬁrm and product/country variables.
Table 7: Interaction of Qc with TFPi, ki η
hq
i , and η
hq
i . Dependent variable: yi,p,c=1 for intra-ﬁrm
(marginal eﬀects presented).




1st quintile -0.0133*** -0.0019 0.0472*** -0.0080***
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0124) (0.0022)
2nd quintile -0.0079*** -0.0024*** 0.0443*** -0.0031
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0111) (0.0020)
3rd quintile -0.0063*** 0.0009 0.0587*** -0.0010
(0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0100) (0.0018)
4th quintile -0.0056*** 0.0022*** 0.0462*** 0.0025
(0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0092) (0.0017)
5th quintile -0.0017 0.0028*** 0.0597*** 0.0054***
(0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0076) (0.0013)
Number of observations 199,870 199,870 199,870 199,870
Pseudo R2 0.1525 0.1516 0.1527 0.1540
Log Likelihood -39,132 -39,174 -39,125 -39,065
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** , * denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
This risk of such an kind of exercise is to run into a taxonomy of stylized facts that would
not be very much valuable for the reader. However there are at least two interesting cases to
analyze. Antr` as and Helpman (2008) show that the Standard Eﬀect (the quality of institutions
favors outsourcing over intra-ﬁrm) comes from the subpopulation of relatively low productive
ﬁrms. By contrast, the opposite Surprise Eﬀect comes from high productive ﬁrms subpopulation.
Thanks to our ﬁrm level data we can try to identify the tension between the Standard and the
Surprise Eﬀect by looking at the interaction between of productivity (as well as capital, skill and
headquarter intensity) with Qc.
In particular, for each NES114 industry, we have computed the 5 quintiles of the distributions
of TFPi, ki, η
hq
i , and etask
i and further constructed ﬁve variables taking the the value of the
corresponding quintile for each ﬁrm-level variable. Finally, we have created a cross product variable
between each quintile and Qc and estimated model ?? adding these additional cross eﬀects. We
have performed 4 diﬀerent estimations for each of the 4 interacting variable.24
Results of such estimations are reported in Table ?? and, in order to save space, we report
only interaction variables’ marginal eﬀects and signiﬁcance. The sign of quintiles is meaningless.
What we should check is if these values decrease or increase signiﬁcantly when moving from the





25Table 8: Interaction of µ1
p with TFPi, ki η
hq
i , and η
hq
i . Dependent variable: yi,p,c=1 for intra-ﬁrm
(marginal eﬀects presented).
Cross eﬀect of µ1




1st quintile -0.0028** 0.0080*** -0.0598*** 0.0132***
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0150) (0.0029)
2nd quintile -0.0005 0.0038*** -0.0578*** 0.0137***
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0126) (0.0026)
3rd quintile -0.0013 0.0040*** -0.0385*** 0.0141***
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0110) (0.0025)
4th quintile -0.0019** 0.0037*** -0.0499*** 0.0138***
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0096) (0.0024)
5th quintile -0.0018*** 0.0032*** -0.0220*** 0.0113***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0076) (0.0018)
Number of observations 199,870 199,870 199,870 199,870
Pseudo R2 0.1495 0.1502 0.1502 0.1497
Log Likelihood -39,275 -39,240 -39,239 -39,263
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** , * denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
1st to the 5th quintile. In the case of the interaction between Qc and TFPi one can see that
the diﬀerence between the ﬁfth and the ﬁrst quintile is positive and (considering twice the sum
of standard deviations) is also signiﬁcant. Actually, values are signiﬁcantly higher moving up in
the quintile scale in all interaction cases except for headquarter intensity. This means that the
quality of country c contract enforcement has a stronger positive eﬀect on sourcing via intra-ﬁrm,
the more productive, capital- and skill-intensive is a ﬁrm:
• Result 5: The ‘surprise’ eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger for more productive, capital intensive,
and skill intensive ﬁrms. This original result is certainly reminiscent of the heterogeneous
impact of Qc in Antr` as and Helpman (2008).
The second intriguing question is related to contractibility. We have seen that ﬁrms prefer to
produce complex inputs and ﬁnal goods within the ﬁrm boundaries. However, it would be inter-
esting for future theoretical work to know whether ﬁrms with certain observable characteristics
are more likely to do so.
In Tables ?? and ?? we perform a similar exercise to the one reported in Table ??. For each
NES114 industry, we have again computed the 5 quintiles dummies of the distributions of TFPi,
ki, η
hq
i , and etask
i . We have subsequently created a cross product variable between each quintile
and µ1
p (Table ??) and µ1
f (Table ??) while estimating model ?? with such additional cross eﬀects.
26Table 9: Interaction of µ1
f with TFPi, ki η
hq
i , and η
hq
i . Dependent variable: yi,p,c=1 for intra-ﬁrm
(marginal eﬀects presented).
Cross eﬀect of µ1




1st quintile -0.0010 0.0106*** 0.0670*** 0.0343***
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0180) (0.0050)
2nd quintile -0.0005 0.0067*** 0.0784*** 0.0361***
(0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0146) (0.0047)
3rd quintile -0.0011 0.0020*** 0.0878*** 0.0354***
(0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0126) (0.0045)
4th quintile -0.0016 0.0056*** 0.0571*** 0.0313***
(0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0111) (0.0044)
5th quintile -0.0020 0.0028*** 0.0550*** 0.0261***
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0087) (0.0036)
Number of observations 199,870 199,870 199,870 199,870
Pseudo R2 0.1494 0.1516 0.1507 0.1502
Log Likelihood -39,278 -39,175 -39,217 -39,242
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** , * denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Tables inspection reveals that only capital intensity matters. In particular, the higher the
capital intensity of the ﬁrm the more negative is the impact of contractibility, of both the imported
product and the ﬁnal good, on intra-ﬁrm trade. To put diﬀerently this original ﬁnding:
• Stylized fact 4: High capital intensive ﬁrms are more likely to produce complex goods within
ﬁrm boundaries.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the determinants of the internalization of imports of intermediate products.
We have constructed a unique cross-section database of 1,141,393 French import transactions in
1999 (ﬁrm-country-product triples) corresponding to 126,926 importers, 201 countries and 272
products . In this dataset we have identiﬁed intra-ﬁrm transactions and have built a binary
variable taking value one when transactions are intra-ﬁrm. Although little in number, intra-ﬁrm
transactions represents a large portion of total imports. We have then conducted a detailed
examination of ﬁrm-, exporter country- and product- level determinants of intra-ﬁrm trade and
their interaction in the light of the property-rights models of the international ﬁrm boundaries,
due to Antr` as (2003), Antr` as and Helpman (2004), and Antr` as and Helpman (2008).
27We start by assessing that the the theory overlooks the diﬀerent dimensions of ﬁrms’ het-
erogeneity. Firms are in fact not only diﬀerent in their productivity. Even in narrowly deﬁned
industries, they in fact display a lot of heterogeneity in variables like capital, skill, and headquarter
intensity that crucially aﬀects the optimal sourcing mode. However, once recognized their ﬁrm-
level dimension, the sign and signiﬁcance of these variables is in line with the basic mechanisms
of the residual property rights approach.
We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms engaged in intra-ﬁrm trade are more productive and that they value the
level of the exporting country quality of enforcement diﬀerently. Moreover, we show that intra-ﬁrm
trade involves low capital intensive inputs imported from low capital intensive countries.
We take a broad view of intra-ﬁrm trade and provide some robust empirical evidence that
can inspire future theoretical work. In particular we show that complex goods and inputs are
more likely to be produced within the ﬁrm boundaries and this is particularly true for capital
intensive ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is consistent with a framework in which internalization reduces
the dissipation of intangible assets. Complex inputs are valuable for ﬁrms in part because they
embody costly R&D eﬀorts and provide producers with market power. As they require physical
and legal protection to prevent imitation, ﬁrm boundaries represent a safe place to put these
valuable intangible assets while countries providing better protection of property rights oﬀer more
guarantees against imitation.
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30A Data Appendix
A.1 The EIIG database
An intra-ﬁrm transaction is deﬁned in the EIIG database as a transaction with an aﬃliate con-
trolled by a single French entity with at least ﬁfty percent of its equity capital. The SESSI deﬁnes
two types of transaction with independent suppliers: 1) formal contractual relationships that refer
to alliances, franchising, joint-ventures, and licensing agreements; 2) informal relationships that
involve less stringent contract relationships. We consider both types of transactions with indepen-
dent suppliers as outsourcing. In the data 20,952 out of the 81,217 transactions (25.80%) are ‘pure’
intra-ﬁrm (in the sense that 100% of imports of product p from country c come from a foreign
aﬃliate), 50,021 (61.59%) are ‘pure’ outsourcing,25 and 10,244 (12.61%) are ‘mixed transactions’
in the sense that only a share of imports of product p from country c in the year 1999 comes
from a foreign aﬃliate, with the remaining share being imported from a third party. In order to
exploit some of the information contained in mixed transactions, we consider them as intra-ﬁrm
(outsourcing) if the share of intra-ﬁrm (outsourcing) in the total transaction value exceeds 80% 26
ending up with 76,364 ﬁrm-product-country triples corresponding to 4,193 ﬁrms. 31.28% of these
transactions are intra-ﬁrm corresponding to 55.48% of total imports value in the dataset. For a
detailed description of the EIIG database see Guannel and Plateau (2003).
A.2 TFP estimations
The starting EAE database consists of an unbalanced panel of 28,587 ﬁrms over 3 years (1998
to 2000) for a total of 74,120 observations. Observations with negative values of value added,
production, capital stock and material inputs are eliminated. Outliers, identiﬁed as observations
falling outside the 1st and 99th percentile of the distributions of value added per worker and
capital stock per worker, are also not considered for TFP estimation. This leaves us with TFP
information on 22,928 ﬁrms for the core year 1999. TFP estimation has been carried out separately
for each of the 56 NES11427 industries in manufacturing.
Total Factor Productivity of ﬁrm i and is as the residual (plus the constant) of a log-linearized
25In particular 48,603 are pure informal third party transactions, 1,093 are pure formal third party transactions
and 325 are mixed formal and informal third party transactions.
26Estimation results are not aﬀected by the exclusion of the those mixed transactions that we impute as either
intra-ﬁrm or outsourcing.
27The French NES114 (Nomenclature Economique de Synth` ese) sector classiﬁcation has the advantage of allowing
us to merge product and sector information. Its level of detail is roughly between NACE rev1 2 and 3 digit.
A-1three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function, with labor, capital and material inputs as pro-
duction inputs. We use the revenue added-based Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator. Labor
is the full time equivalent average number of employees in a given year. Production is calculated
as production sold plus stocks variations. Material inputs are calculated as bought inputs minus
stocks variation. Deﬂators for production and material inputs are obtained from the national
accounts system of the French Statistical Oﬃce (INSEE) at the NACE rev1 two digit level.
A.3 Construction of contractibility variables
The basic data needed to construct contractibility measures comes from Rauch (1999) and are
organized on the basis of the SITC rev2 4 digit (975 products for which information is available). In
our empirical analysis we work with the CPA96 4digit classiﬁcation (490 products). However, the
Rauch data cover almost exclusively manufacturing and agricultural goods. Restricting ourselves
to such goods leaves us with 247 CPA96 4digit products.
In order to aggregate the Rauch data to construct a measure of contractibility for imported
goods, we have ﬁrst established a correspondence between HS6 and SITC rev2 4 digit and a
correspondence between HS6 and CPA96 4digit.28 We have then used import trade data in
1999 for France at the HS6 level (provided by EUROSTAT) as weights to aggregate the original
SITC rev2 4 digit information to the CPA96 4digit. Using this methodology, we have built 2




j ) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the HS6 product j is neither sold
on an organized exchange nor reference priced (not reference priced),29 and by θp,j the share of
the HS6 product j in the French imports of CPA96 4digit product p in 1999 we have:
1. µ1













As for the ﬁnal product contractibility, we have ﬁrst used a correspondence table form the
PRODCOM2002 8 digit classiﬁcation to the HS6 provided by EUROSTAT. Then, exploiting the
previously build HS6 to SITC and HS6 to CPA correspondence tables, we have used production
28Correspondence tables have been obtained using RAMON data available at the web-site:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST REL
29We actually use the ‘Liberal’ Rauch classiﬁcation. Results are virtually unchanged if we use the ‘conservative’
one.
A-2data in 1999 for France at the PRODCOM2002 8 digit classiﬁcation level (provided by EURO-




j ) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the PRODCOM2002
8 digit product f is neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference priced (not reference
priced),30 and by θf,j the share of the PRODCOM2002 8 digit product j in the French production
of CPA96 4digit product f in 1999 we have:
1. µ1













A.4 Other imported product variables
The other two variables we have constructed are the capital and skill intensity in the production of
imported product p denoted, respectively, by kp and hp. In order to build such measures, we start
by using a correspondence table between the industry classiﬁcation NACE rev1 4digit (available in
our EAE ﬁrm dataset) and the product classiﬁcation CPA96 4digit. We then compute the average
capital intensity (log of capital/labor ratio) and skill intensity (log of total wage expenses/number
of full time equivalent workers) of French ﬁrms associated to a given CPA96 4digit product.
B Levinsohn and Petrin TFP estimator
The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach consists of a two stages procedure based on the identiﬁ-
cation of a proxy variable for the unobserved (by the econometrician) productivity component ωit.
The identiﬁcation stems from the assumption that intermediate inputs consumption in production
reacts to the observed (by the ﬁrm) productivity.
Let us start with a standard log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function where y is log
output, k is log capital stock, l is log employment, m is log intermediate inputs, ω is a productivity
shock observed by the ﬁrm but not by the econometrician and possibly correlated with inputs,
and u is a random term not correlated with any other component of the regression function:
yit = αkit + β lit + γmit + ωit + uit. (A.1)
30We actually use the ‘Liberal’ Rauch classiﬁcation. Results are virtually unchanged if we use the ‘conservative’
one.
A-3The intermediate input’s demand function of ﬁrm i at time t is assumed to be mit = mit(ωit,kit)
and can be used to generate, once inverted (the invertibility condition is that, conditional on
capital, the intermediate inputs demand must be increasing in ω), the proxy-variable:
ωit = git(mit,kit) (A.2)
which, substituted in equation (??), yields:
yit = β lit + Φit(mit,kit) + uit (A.3)
where
Φit(mit,kit) = αkit + γmit + git(mit,kit) (A.4)
The two last equations form a “partially linear” model identifying β. Since the regressors
are no longer correlated with the error, β can be now estimated approximating Φ by a third or
fourth order polynomial (˜ Φ). However, α and γ are not identiﬁed at this stage; in order to yield a
consistent estimation, we need to introduce some more structure into the model and to use, in a
second stage, the estimated coeﬃcient of labor (ˆ β). To see this, net from the output in equation
(??) the estimated contribution of labor
yit − ˆ β lit = αkit + γmit + ωit + uit (A.5)
and assume, for simplicity, that ωit evolves according to a ﬁrst-order Markov process, which
implies that ωit = E[ωit | ωit−1] + eit, where eit, the s.c. ”surprise”, denotes innovation in ωit.
Accordingly, capital and material inputs in t adjusts, through investment, to ωt−1, but they do

















where: h indexes the elements of Zt = (kt,mt−1); i indexes ﬁrms; Ti0, and Ti1 are, respectively,
the ﬁrst and last period in which ﬁrm i is observed; and
\ (eit + uit) = yit − ˆ βlit − α∗kit − γ∗mit − \ E[ωit | ωit−1]. (A.7)
According to (??), in order to proceed with the minimization of (??), we need to know α∗, γ∗,
and \ E[ωit | ωit−1] (ˆ β is known from the ﬁrst stage).31
31The vector
E[(eit + uit) | Zt],
A-4We can start from calculating the following residuals:
yit − ˆ βlit = ˆ Φit (A.10)
then, ωit can be obtained using any candidate values α∗ and γ∗ in the following equation:
ˆ ait = ˆ Φit − α∗kit − γ∗mit. (A.11)
Using these values, we are able to obtain a consistent approximation to \ E[ωit | ωit−1] from
\ E[ωit | ωit−1] = δ0 + δ1ωit−1 + δ2ω2
it−1 + δ3ω3
it−1 + it (A.12)
Finally, given ˆ βit, α∗, γ∗, and \ E[ωit | ωit−1], the solution of problem (??) provides the estimation
of capital (ˆ α) and intermediate input (ˆ γ) coeﬃcients.
at the base of the moment conditions, results from the two following assumptions (which, in turn, represent the
conditions under which intermediate input can be thought of as a ”perfect proxy” for ωit). The ﬁrst one is that
period t’s capital is determined by the investment decisions in the previous period, so that it does not respond to
the productivity innovation (eit) in the current period:
E [(eit + uit) | kit] = 0 (A.8)
The second assumption is that last period’s intermediate input choice is uncorrelated with the innovation in the
current period:
E [(eit + uit) | mit−1] = 0 (A.9)
A-5